The Influence Of Insider Ownership, Deviden Policy And Debt Policy to The Firm Value at

Companies Which are Enlisted in Indonesia Stock Exchange by Hermuningsih, Sri et al.
1The Influence Of Insider Ownership, Deviden Policy And Debt Policy to The Firm Value at
Companies Which are Enlisted in Indonesia Stock Exchange
Dra. Sri Hermuningsih, MM.
Faculty Of Economics, Universitas Sarjanawiyata Tamansiswa
Yogyakarta
Dr. Dwipraptono Agus Harjito.
Faculty Of Economics, Universitas Islam Indonesia
Yogyakarta
Dewi Kusuma Wardani,SE
Faculty Of Economics, Universitas Sarjanawiyata Tamansiswa
Yogyakarta
Abstract
The aim of this study was proving the influences of insider ownership, debt policy, and dividend policy to firm
value at companies which were listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Object of this study were companies which
were listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2003 to 2008. This study used Two Stage Least Square (TSLS)
method to know the influence between four factors. TSLS method through six phases, that was 1). TSLS for the
insider ownership to firm value 2). TSLS for the debt policy to firm value 3). TSLS for dividend policy to firm
value 4). TSLS for the insider ownership to debt policy 5). TSLS for the insider ownership to dividend policy 6).
TSLS for the debt policy to dividend with storey level isn't it 0.05.
This study findings indicated that 1) insider ownership have not an effect to company value 2). debt policy have not
an effect on value company 3) dividend have not effect to company value 4). insider ownership have not an effect
to debt policy 5 ). insider ownership have not an effect to dividend policy 6). debt policy have not an effect on to
dividend.
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1.Introduction
The purpose of company management is to give prosperity to the owner. The higher of share price means that the
owner prosperity will higher too. Share market price shows firm value. Thereby, if share prices are increased, the
firm values will be increased too. To get that purpose, the owners (as principle) can entrust to the professional or
insider or called by agent. That professional or managers will responsible for, first, the fund allocation decision,
both for inside fund and outside fund for investment. Second is expenditure decision. This decision will relate with
optimum expenditure. Third is dividend decision (Hardjito, 2006).
The trust that is given to insider can be viewed as the function dissociation of decision making and of risk beating
(Jansen & Meckling, 1976). Owners as fund resources have an importance to protect their investment fund, while
the insiders are entitled for salary and other compensation because they make the best decision for owner. But often
insiders work not to maximize firm value, but minimize, or just improve their prosperity. The owner do not like
that way because the costs will increase and dividend will decline. Owners are prefers to be financed by debt, but
managers do not like because the debt has high risk. Therefore, the insider existence is related to firm value.
Meanwhile, debt policy also related to firm value. Considering tax, firm value or stock price will be determined by
capital structure. The improvement of debt proportion makes the stock prices higher, but in the specific point the
improvement of debt is less than the expenses. While Homaifar, Benkato, and Zietz (1994) found that stock profit
2influences decision of capital structure. They found that stock gain had negative relation with debt. This argument
supports the opinion that company tends to replace debt with equity if the stock gain level is high.
Dividend policy can be related with firm value. There are three theories, MM argues that dividend policy is not
relevant. It means that is no optimum dividend because dividend does not influence firm value. Second group is
Gordon-Litner. They argue that dividend has less risk than capital gain, so dividend after tax and dividend that give
higher dividend yield will minimize cost of capital. Third group is the group that argues that because dividend is
subject of tax so the investors ask for the profit level higher for the higher dividend yield. This group suggests that
the lower dividend yield can maximize firm value. Those three arguments give a justification that dividend has an
effect to firm value (Hardjito, 2006).
This research aim is to prove the influence of insider ownership, debt policy, and dividend policy to firm value at
companies which are enlisted in Indonesia Stock Exchange.
2. Relevant Literature
Insiders Ownership
To reduce agency cost can be done with improving the insider ownership, on the chance of spreading the risk.
Managers have tendency to use the excess of profit for the consumption and opportunistic behavior. Managers also
have tendency to use the higher debt not to maximize firm value, but to their opportunistic behavior. Those will
improve debt interest expenses because the firm bankrupt risk is increase, so agency cost of debt will increase too.
The high agency cost of debt can reduce the firm value. With insider ownership, insider can get direct benefit from
their decisions, but also bear the direct risk if their decisions are wrong. Insider ownership can also reduce
misallocation resource allocation. Thereby the insider ownership is incentive to improve firm performance.
Dividend Policy
Dividend policy is decision about how much profit that be payed as dividend to compensate the investment and
how many that left in firm as an investment. (Brigham and of Houston, 2006:32). If companies choose give profit
as dividend, they will reduce their profit and internal fund resources. On the contrary, if companies do not choose
to give dividend, their internal fund formation capabilities will be increasing.
Dividend policy is controversial because of their investor behaviors and characteristics. There are contradictive
theories related with dividend policies and still debatable until now. Brigham and Houston theory (2006:69):
a. Irrelevance Theory
This theory convinces that a company dividend policy do not has influence to firm value and cost of capital.
b. Bird in the hand theory
This theory convinces that we can maximize firm value by specified high dividend payout ratio because owners
like if the dividend is high so the stock price will increase too.
c. Tax Preference Theory
This theory convinces that low dividend payout is more preferred by investor because (1) dividend tax that must be
pay by investor is higher than long term capital gain, (2) capital gain tax must not be pay until the stock is sold, (3)
there is tax remove if the owner dead.
3Debt Policy
MM argues that high debt usage will make high risk and high cost of capital. Thereby, usage of debt will not make
high firm value because the cheaper debt cost benefits will be pay with the increasing of cost of capital itself. This
opinion then was introduced by MM herself in 1963. If there is firm revenue tax, usage of debt will make the firm
value increasing because debt interest expense is an expense that reduce tax (tax deductable expense).
The usage increasing of debt financing will influence equity capital transfer. Jensen (1986) says that debt can use to
manage overload free cash flow by manager, so useless investment can be avoided. The debt usage can increase
firm value. That increasing of firm value is related with stock price and the decline of debt will make down stock
price (Masulis, 1988). But, the increasing of debt will make the increasing of bankrupt- risk if the debt is used not
careful.
Firm value
The fundamental company target is maximized profit. Now, this view change because its target weaknesses
(Sartono, 2001:7). Those weaknesses are: first, microeconomic standard with maximize profit is stag because
getting the run around time dimension, so that are no difference between short term and long term profit. Second,
the profit definition is maximize nominal profit or profit level. Third, is about decision alternative risk. Maximizing
profit without pay attention with risk is big false. Fourth, maximizing profit can be done by investing stock sell
fund in deposit, but owner want the higher deposit interest from the higher risk too, so the market value will decline
and firm value will decline too.
Based on those weaknesses, firm value will move to be firm objective maximization through maximization wealth
of stockholders. Stockholders wealth will increase if their stock prices are increasing. Public firm value is
determined by stock price, while non-public firm value is determined by the same market (Sartono, 2001:8).
According to J. Keown, Scott, and Martin (2004: 849), there are quantitative variables that can used to estimate the
firm value:
a. Book value
Book value is the amount of assets from of balance sheet less by account payable or owner equity. Book value do
not calculate firm market price as a whole because book value is calculated by historical firm asset data.
b. Company market price
Market stock price is an approach to estimate net business value. If stock is registered in security market and
widely commercialized, value approach can be build by market price. Value approach is more usable approach to
estimate big company, and this value can change immediately.
c. Firm value appraisal
Firm which is based on independent appraiser will permit the reduction of goodwill if the firm asset price is
increase. Goodwill is produced when firm purchase value more than its asset book value.
d. Expected cash flow
The value is used in merger or acquisition. Present value of cash flow which is determined will maximum and must
be pay by target firm. The down payment can reduce present net value of merger. Present value is free cash flow
future.
4Hypotheses
H1 : There is a significant positive effect of insider ownership on corporate value
H2 : There is a significant positive impact of debt policy to firm values
H3 : There is a significant positive effect of dividend payment policy of the company's value
H4 : There is a negative relationship between insider ownership with debt policy
H5 : There is a negative relationship between insider ownership with dividend payment policy
H6 : There is a negative relationship between debt with dividend payment policy
3. Research Design And Methods
1. Population and Sample
Population of company was all companies which are enlisted at Indonesia Stock Exchange since 2003 to 2008.
While the sample chosing used purposive sampling method, with sampling judgment were the companies that had
financial statement during the research period, had percentage of insider ownership data, gave dividend, had debt,
and had positive EBIT.
2. Operational Definition of Variable
1) INSD = Insider Ownership
Insider ownership was the share percentage that be owned by insider, like director or manager. The formula was:
INSD = Amount of shares that were owned insider
Total of share
2) DEBT = Debt Policy
Debt usage level from a company can be shown by debt to equity ratio (DER). Debt to equity ratio is a ratio of total
debt to total owner equity. The formula is:
DER = Total Liabilities or Total Debt
Total Owner Equity
3) DPR = Dividend Policy
Financial ratio that could use to measure the level of dividend that was gave to owner was Dividend Payout
Ratio (DPR). DPR was the ratio that showed the comparison between Dividend-per-Share (DPS) and Earning-
Per-Share (EPS). The formula is:
DPR = Dividend per share
Earning per share (EPS)
54) PBV = Firm value
Price to book value or PBV shows how much market appraises book value of company stock. Higher this ratio
means market trust to that firm prospect. The formula is:
PBV = Stock Price
BV
3. Research Model
Description:
INSD = Insider Ownership DPR = Dividend Policy
DEBT = Debt Policy PBV = Firm value
4 . Analysis Technique
Joher et.al (2005) use equation model Two Stage Least Square (2 SLS) to test for the simultaneous determination
of endogenous variables. The use of 2 SLS to provide a consistent and unbiased result. To test Hypotheses 1
through 6, performed by Two Stage Least Square:
1. PBV = a0 + a1 INSD + a2 DEBT + a3 DIVD + RISK + GROWTH + SIZE + e
2. INSD = b0 + b1 DEBT + b2 DIVD + RISK + GROWTH + SIZE + e
3. DEBT= c0 + c1 INSD + c2 DIVD + RISK + GROWTH + SIZE + e
4. DIVD= d0 + d1 INSD + d2 DEBT + RISK + GROWTH + SIZE + e
4. DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 shows the statistical charactersitics including average and standard deviation for all of these dependent and
independent variables that used in this study.
DPR
INSD
PBV
DEBT
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Descriptive Statistic of Dependent and Independent Variable of Indonesia’s Data
Variable N Minimum Maximum Average Standar
Deviation
Dependent:
DEBT 56 1.208890 6.284485 1.284223 1.316555
INSD 56 0.021667 10.51000 3.334554 3.190110
DIVD 56 -0.006467 0.550686 0.042087 0.099720
PBV 56 -0.175289 5.150117 1.104632 0.994217
Independent:
SIZE 56 10.55674 17.40800 13.26634 1.471319
RISK 56 -0.987542 20.11380 1.185282 3.573959
GROWTH 56 -0.745693 0.535996 -0.255106 0.292443
The simultaneously test of the relationship between debt policies, insider ownership, and dividend policy in the
agency problem monitoring mechanism in this study using the method of least squares regression on two levels
(two-stage least square, 2 SLS). The analysis result of 2SLS method for each variable ad shown in table 2.
TABLE 2
2SLS Regression Result of The Relationship between Debt Policy, Insider Ownership, and Dividend Ratio to Indonesia
Companies Values
Dependent VariablesIndependent variables
DEBT INSD DIVD PBV
Constanta 4.2134
(0.2903)
4.9256
(1.4368)
0.1525 (1.2902) 0.1539
(0.0270)
DEBT - -0.1957
(-0.0802)
-0.0063
(-0.0836)
0.4724
(0.7358)
INSD -0.6178
(-0.1989)
- -0.0307
(-1.4195)
0.1071
(0.0939)
DIVD -20.6492
(-0.2075)
-31.832
(-1.4200)
- -0.3169
(-0.0086)
SIZE 0.1147
0.8546
-0.3326
(-1.0475)
0.0094
(0.9545)
-0.0116
(-0.1195)
RISK -0.0357
(-0.6366)
-0.1735
(-1.3194)
0.0062
(1.5211)
-0.0263
(-0.6485)
GROWTH
R2 value
Durbin-Watson
-0.0745
(-0.1136)
-4.1361
1.9380
-1.6805
(-1.0924)
-0.7042
1.9813
0.0405
(0.8400)
-0.6834
1.9789
-0.1979
(-0.6485)
0.0475
2.0566
Note:
*** Significant at the significance level 1%
** Significant at the significance level 5%
* Significant at the significance level 10%
t-Statistic value in the brackets.
Hypothesis 1
From the hypotheses testing resulted the influence of insider ownership variables (INSD) to the the firm value is
positive but not significant (β = 0.1071; t = 0.0939). This shows that the increase in the number of manager’s shares
is likely to increase the firm value but is not significant. From these results indicate that the hypothesis (1) is also
not proven. Hypothesis (1) which state there is a significant positive effect of insider ownership on corporate value
proved, but not completely.
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From the results from hypothesis testing, the influences of ratio of debt (DEBT) to the company's value (PBV) is
positive and significant (β = 0.4724; t = 0.7358). This positive relationship indicates that the increase in debt will
raise the value of the company. The results of this study support the hypothesis (2) is proposed. Hypothesis (2)
states that there is a significant positive impact of debt policy to firm values. Therefore, hypothesis (2) proved in
this study.
Hypothesis 3
From the results of hypotheses testing, dividend (DIVD) has a negative relationship and not significant with Price
to book value (β = -0.3169; t = -0.0086). The increased of dividend payments a negative signal to investors about
the state of the company. Maybe, this is caused by the manipulation of actual situation that occurred in the
company concerned. In addition, a high dividend payment was not necessarily a sign for investors that the agency
problem can be reduced. Dividend payments as a reducer mechanism for agency problems have not used as a
regulatory tool by the owner to reduce the agency problems. Thus the hypothesis (3) which state there is a
significant positive effect of dividend payment policy of the company's value is not proven in this study.
Hypothesis 4
From the hypotheses testing results that insider ownership variable (INSD) to debt (debt), debt variable coefficients
shows a negative relationship, but not significantly with insider ownership (β = -0.1957; t = -0.0802). Direct
relationship between insider ownership with debt shows that the increase in debt will cause a decrease of insider
ownership. In the monitoring context indicates that the role of insider ownership in Indonesia can replace the role
of debt in the regulatory mechanism, although the problem is not effective agents. Therefore, these two monitoring
mechanisms need to be done together. The results of this study do not support the first hypothesis (H4) which states
there is a negative relationship between insider ownership with debt policy as a monitoring mechanism for agency
problems.
Hypothesis 5
From the hypotheses testing results that insider ownership variable (INSD) has a negative coefficient but not
significant (β = -0.0307; t = -1.4195). The increasing of insider ownership to improve the agreement or alignment
(alignment) between the shareholders by managers in improving corporate profits does not give the impression of
significantly decreasing the level of dividend payments. In the context of controlling mechanisms of agency
problem, it indicates that the increasing of insider ownership can not replace the role of dividend payment policy to
reduce agency problems. In other words, payment of dividends as the financial policy can not be replaced by
insider ownership role as a policy rather than finance the agency problem’s controlling mechanisms. The
implication is that the increasing of insider ownership is not reducing the dividend payment. The results of this
study do not support the fifth hypothesis (H5)
Hypothesis 6
The analysis results that coefficients of debt variables in the dividends (DIVD) equation model is negative and not
significant (β = -0.0063; t = -0.0836). This means that the debt ratio increased by 1% would reduce the dividend
payment ratio of 0.63% in the role of agency problems monitoring. This negative relationship indicates that there is
the relationship between debt policies and dividend payment policy in the agency's problems monitoring
mechanisms. But these replacement relationships is ineffective. The role of dividends as a reducer mechanism of
agency problems will decrease with the increasing of debt levels. This study result does not support the sixth
hypotheses (H6) that are described in the debt ratio equation.
8PBV = 0.1539 + 0.1071 INSD + 0.4724 DEBT - 0.3169 DIVD - 0.026320 RISK - 0.197997 GROWTH -
0.011634 SIZE
INSD = 4.9256 - 0.1957 DEBT - 31.8320 DIVD - 0.1735 RISK - 1.6805 GROWTH - 0.3326 SIZE
DEBT = 4.2134 - 0.6178 INSD - 20.6492 DIVD - 0.0357 RISK - 0.0745 GROWTH + 0.1147 SIZE
DIVD = 0.1525 + -0.0307 INSD + -0.0063 DEBT + 0.0062 RISK + 0.0405 GROWTH + 0.0094 SIZE
5. Suggestion
For investor, if they want to invest in capital markets, investors should be able to see, analyze, and predict the
factors that affect the company value, both of the internal and external factors in order to get the results as
expected.
For researcher, the number of samples is relatively less, so the researchers who will take the the same topic should
take more sample and extend the period, so that will increase the accuracy of the research results.
Bibliography
Bathala, CT., Moon, KP., Rao, RP.(1994).”Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and The Impact of Institutional
Holding: An Agency Perspective”. Financial Management, Vol 23, No. 3. P. 38-50.
Brailsford, Timothy J., Barry R. Oliver, Sandra L. H. Pua. (1999). “Theory and Evidence on the Relationship
between Onwership Structure and Capital Structure”. http://ssrn.com/
Brigham, Eugene F. and Joel F Houston. (1999). Manajemen Keuangan, Edisi Bahasa Indonesia. Jakarta: Erlangga
Brigham, Eugene F. and Louis C. Gapenski. (1990). Intermediate Financial Management, Florida: The Dryden
Press
Christiawan, Yulius Jogi dan Josua Tarigan. (2006). ”Kepemilikan Manajeral: Kebijakan Hutang, Kinerja, dan
Nilai Perusahaan”. http://puslit.petra.ac.id/ journals/accounting
Coopers, D.R., & Pamela S. Schindler. (2000). Business Research Methods.New York:McGraw-Hill International
editions,
Crutchley,C.E., and Hansen,R.S. (1998). “A Test of Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage
and Corporate Dividens”. Financial Management, 36 – 46.
Dahya et al. (2008). “Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards, and Corporate Value: A Cross-Country Analysis”,
Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 73-100
Easterbrook, F.H. (1984). “Two Agency-Cost Explanation Of Dividends”. American Economic Review, vol. 74,
No.4, pp.650-659.
Farinha, J. (2003). ”Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance And The Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An
Empirical Analysis”. Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting, vol. 30, Nos. 9&10, pp.1173-1209.
Friend I, and L. H. P. Lang.(1988). “An empirical test of the impact of managerial self-interest on corporate capital
structure”. Journal of Finance, 43, 271-281.
9Fuerst, Oren and Hyon Kang-Sok. (2000). Corporate Governance Expected Operating Performance, and Pricing”
Working Papers; Yale School of Management, pp. 1-138
Gordon, M.J.(1959).”Dividends, Earnings, and Stock Prices”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 41, No.
2, Part 1 (May, 1959), pp. 99-105. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1927792.
Gujarati D.N.(2003).Basic Econometrics 4th edition.New York.McGraw Hill Inc.
Harjito, Dwipraptono Agus.(2006).” Hubungan Kebijakan Hutang, Insider Ownership dan Kebijakan Dividen
dalam Mekanisme Pengawasan Masalah Agensi di Indonesia”. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Auditing
Indonesia10 (2): 161-182, Fakultas Ekonomi UII Yogyakarta, Desember 2006.
Harjito, Dwipraptono Agus.(2007).” Analisis Hubungan antara Kepemilikan Insider, Leverage Perusahaan dan
Kebijakan Dividen”. Telaah Bisnis 8 (1), PPPM Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Manajemen, YKPN, Yogyakarta,
Juli, 2007
Homaifar, G. J. Ziest, and O. Benkato.(1994). "An empirical model of capital structure: some new evidence",
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 21, p. 1-14
Iturriaga, F. J. L. and Sanz J. A. R.(1998). Ownership Structure, Corporate Value and Firm Investment: A Spanish
Firms Simultaneous Equations Analysis. Working Paper. Universidad De Valladolid, 1-32
Jensen, M.C. (1986). “Agency Costs Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, And Takeovers”. American Economic
Review, vol. 76, No.2, pp. 323-329.
Jensen, M., C. dan WH Meckling.(1976).”Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost, and Ownership
Structure”.Journal of Financial Economics, p 3-24.
Jensen, M., & Meckling. (1976). “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency, and ownership structure”.
Journal of Financial Economics, 4, 305-360.
Jensen, Solberg, & Zorn.(1992). “Simultaneous determination of insider ownership, debt, and dividend policies”.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 27, No.2, 247-263
Kim, W., and E. Sorensen.(1986). “Evidence on the impact of the agency cost of debt on corporate debt policy”.
journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, p. 247-263
La Porta et al. (1998).”Law and Finance”.Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155
La Porta et al. (2002). “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation”.Journal of Finance, 57, 1147 - 1170
Lasfer, Meziane and Faccio, Mara. (1999). “Managerial Ownership, Board Structure and Firm Value: The UK
Evidence”. http://ssrn.com
Leland, H,. & D. Pyle. (1977). “Informational asymetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation”.Journal
of Finance, 32, 371-388.
Lintner, J. (1956). “Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes”. The
American Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-eighth Annual Meeting
of the American Economic Association. (May, 1956), pp. 97-113.
Lisboa, Ines dan Jose Paulo Esperanca. (2006). “Understanding the Relationship Between Insider Ownership and
Performance in Europe”.
10
Litzenberg, RH dan K. Ramaswamy. (1978). “The Effect of Personal Taxes and Dividends on Capital Asset
Prices: Theory and Empirical Evidence”. www.ideas.repec.org.
Mahadwartha, Putu Anom. (2003). “Predictability Power of Dividend Policy and Leverage Policy to Managerial
Ownership in Indonesia:An Agency Theory Perspective”. http://ssrn.com
Masulis, R., W. 1988.Debt / Equity Choice.Canbridge: Ballinger.
Ross, S.(1977). “The determinations of financial structure : The incentive signaling approach”. Bell Journal of
Economics, 8, 23-40.
Smith Jr., Clifford W., and Ross L. Watts. (1992). “The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing,
Dividend an Compensation Policies”. Journal of Financial Economics, 32, pp. 263-292
Soliha, Euis, Taswan. (2002). “Pengaruh Kebijakan Hutang terhadap Nilai Perusahan serta Beberapa Faktor yang
Mempengaruhinya”. Jurnal Bisnis dan Ekonomi, STIE STIKUBANK Semarang.
Sumani. (2007). Pengaruh Faktor Internal dan Faktor Eksternal derta Struktur Keuangan dan Dividend Payout
Ratio terhadap Nilai Perusahaan Manufaktur di Bursa Efek Jakarta.Disertasi Program Pasca Sarjana
Universitas Airlangga. www.unair.ac.id
Vermaelen, (1981). Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signaling: An Empirical Study, Journal of Financial
Economics, June, p. 163-181
Wahidahwati. (2002). “Pengaruh Kepemilikan Manajerial dan Kepemilikan Institusional pada Kebijakan Hutang
Perusahaan: Sebuah Perspektif Theory Agency”. Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Indonesia, Vol. 5, No. 1, Ikatan
Akuntan Indonesia-Kompartemen Akuntan Pendidik, Yogyakarta
Wahyudi, Untung dan Hartini Prasetyaning Prameswari. (2006). Implikasi Struktur Kepemilikan terhadap Nilai
Perusahaan: Dengan Kaputusan Keuangan sebagai Variabel Intervening. Makalah Simposium Nasional
Akuntansi (SNA) 9 Padang
